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Ronald Dore*  
Unions Between Class and Enteprise**  
The speculative observations of a novice 
A paper which is half about German industrial relations, written by someone 
whose background of general ignorance of the German scene has been alleviated by a 
mere ten days of interviewing in German factories and chambers and union 
headquarters, (in July 1994, the „at present“ of the notes which follow), perhaps 
requires some explanation. The only justification for its publication is that it 
represents the impressions of one who (a) has spent most of his life studying that 
other leading exemplar of „Rhenish“ capitalism1, namely Japan, and who (b) began 
his serious reading about capitalism, class, and the direction of history in the late 
1940s when it was still possible to believe that some version of the Marxist paradigm 
– the success, either through revolution or the ballot box, of a „labour movement“ 
which would replace capitalism by some form of socialism – represented the future 
course of Western history. 
We now know better. The SPD decided it knew better already at the Bad 
Godesberg Convention; the British TUC and Labour Party have taken a little longer. 
But, for us English speakers at any rate, the term „labour movement“ is still with us, 
even if the question „movement towards what“ does not always have an answer. It 
might be useful as a preface to the narrative which follows, to begin with a number of 
definitional distinctions. 
I think it would help in clear thinking if we confined the term labour movement 
to: An organizational complex of unions, political parties, study groups, educational 
societies, etc. which share: 
(a) some sense of class-solidarity – both, (i) a sense that its members have 
individual material interests (self-interests) in common which are at variance 
with, and are indeed threatened by, those of other identifiable groups – 
capitalists, industrialists, financiers, landlords, judges, peasants, lawyers, or 
whatever – but especially capitalists, and (ii) some sense of fraternity with all 
other members of the movement which can sometimes activate altruistic 
behaviour (e.g., in sympathy strikes) not explicable by self-interest. 
(b)  the belief that by political action – street demonstrations, insurrections, or use of 
the ballot box – the movement can change society in such a way that its 
                                                          
*  Professor Ronald Dore is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Performance, 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, andAdjunct Professor at MIT. 
**  This paper was provoked by my first ever ten days in German factories. I am enormously 
indebted to Isabela Mares, both for setting up the interviews and interpreting throughout. Also 
to those who have read a draft and set me straight on various things: John Dower, Mari Sako, 
David Marsden, Werner Pascha, Wolfgang Streeck. 
1 To use the categories of Michel Albert (1991). 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 3. Jg., Heft 2, 1996  155 
 
members' share of society's income, wealth and dignity is enhanced. Nowadays 
these beliefs rarely exend to holistic notions about „capitalism“ being replaced 
by „socialism“ and are more likely to centre on ideas for marginal reforms – in 
pension systems, corporate governance, taxation, welfare – which change 
income distribution, and alter the power of workers in the workplace, etc. 
When either of these two conditions – class consciousness and an agenda for 
structural change – ceases to be fulfilled, I think it is best to stop using the word 
„movement“. Britain still has the vestiges of a movement, and so do France and Italy. 
I am not sure how far German unions have a concerted agenda for social change – I 
suspect rather little – but certainly the class-solidarity has remained, as exemplified in 
the central role of inclusive class-representative unions in both industrial relations 
and corporate governance. In Japan, by contrast, as in the United States, it is hard to 
discern in union activity either an agenda for change or manifest signs of nation-wide 
class solidarity. 
I would suggest that we no longer speak of a labour movement in these 
countries, but rather, for Germany, of a system of class-conscious labour 
representation, and for Japan, simply of a system of labour representation. 
But there was a time in both countries' history – Germany in the 1920s and early 
1930s, for instance, and Japan in the years 1945 to 1951 – when they had what was 
undoubtedly a labour movement in the full sense of the term – organizations deeply 
imbued with a sense of working class solidarity and deeply committed to wholesale 
social change. The transformation of Japan to the enterprise-union „system of labour 
representation“ of today has been complete. The transformation of Germany to a 
system which still formally puts class-solidarity ahead of enterprise loyalty has been 
less radical – less radical in fact than in Britain or Sweden where the devolution of 
bargaining to the enterprise level has been a salient feature of the development of 
industrial relations in recent years. What accounts for the difference? 
And how permanent is it? The underlying question of this paper is the following, 
a question which doubtless has been asked many times before: given what seem to be 
universal forces in modern capitalist societies to devolve wage bargaining and 
worker-representational activity to the enterprise, how is it that Germany alone seems 
to have withstood these pressures? And can the explanation lie primarily in the inertia 
of deeply entrenched institutions – which inertia will eventually be eroded by the 
forces which have wrought similar change elsewhere? But first a brief account of the 
Japanese transformation. 
The brief flowering of Japan's „Labour Movement“ 
It would have been hard, in Japan, in late 1946, to imagine the rapidity with 
which those forces were to destroy the Japanese labour movement – hard, that is, if 
one were observing the union leaders of the time (some of them, ironically, men who 
are today just graduating from the Presidency to the Chairmanship of giant Japanese 
companies.) Militant, sweat-banded and vociferous, for ever waving red flags and 
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working up visionary rhetoric about a new Japan, all their efforts were focussed on 
plans for a General Strike which was going to topple the reactionary government and 
create a new and better Japan. 
That general strike never took place. General MacArthur, as head of the 
Occupation Forces, stepped in and forced the main union leader to call it off in a 
tearful broadcast a few hours before it was due to begin. From there on it was down-
hill for the „movement“ all the way to its final demise in the defeat of the Mitsui 
Miike coalmine strike in 1960. 
The pre-war unions were by no means lacking in „movement“ characteristics, at 
first largely supplied by the middle-class intellectuals, lawyers, writers, temperance 
workers, who were inspired by socialist and communist ideologies as well as by pro-
underdog charitable sympathies. By the 1920s unions were producing their own 
working class movement activists, but even at the peak membership point in the 
1930s (400,000 members), the organization of the national movement was 
fragmented, and none of the fragments had anything like the organizational strength 
and resources of, say, the British Trades Union Congress of 1910. For all their 
participation in industry federations or – more commonly – federations based on 
ideological allegiance, the effective units were enterprise units, and the effective 
leaders were only part-time activists who had to keep their enterprise jobs to live. 
From the beginning of the thirties, too, the (foreign, alien) socialist and 
communist inspirations of the movement were challenged by the even stronger 
inspirations of an almost equally egalitarian, and almost equally radical – but home-
grown – fascist Japanism, articulated most clearly by the young army officers whose 
assassinations toppled two governments between 1932 and 1936. By the time worker 
organization had developed to the point at which it was possible to elect men who 
were explicitly worker representatives to the Diet in significant numbers (the election 
of 1937), „Japanist socialism“ had become the dominant ideal – not just „socialism in 
one country“ but socialism as a way of making Japan fit to take on the task of 
defeating Western Imperialist Capitalism. 
So there was little opposition when, three years into the China war, the 
increasingly totalitarian state, in 1940, absorbed all existing unions into the Sampo, 
the Society for Service to the Nation Through Industry, and at the same time gave the 
branches of that Society – the ex-unions where there had previously been unions, new 
bodies where here had not – the right to organize worker representation in works 
councils in every factory. These bodies were not entirely ciphers. They had no strike 
power, of course, but illegal strikes and go-slows did actually take place and these 
committees probably had, on average, more power to resist managerial 
unreasonableness than unions in Eastern Europe and Russia during the communist 
period, because they did not have the competition of factory Party committees. 
Come the defeat in 1945 and the total discrediting of Japanism. Egalitarianism, 
the demand for justice, resentment against privilege, utopian dreaming, frustration at 
the real hardships of a suddenly impoverished society, all got channelled back again 
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into their original Europe-inspired socialist and communist moulds. (And the 
sympathy the Occupation Labour Affairs officials seem to have for those ideals made 
them seem an answer to lingering nationalism, too; socialism might actually be a way 
for Japan to regain respect in the eyes of New Deal America. It took some time for 
the message to sink in that ex-New-Deal America was now preoccupied with 
preventing the spread of communism. It was, indeed, the banning of the General 
Strike which drove it home2.) And to respond to this ferment of ideas, in the Sampo 
cells, there was already in place a structure ready to be tranformed into a system of 
enterprise-based closed shop (post-entry closed shop) unionism. The blue-collar 
unions thus formed were soon joined by white-collar (including younger managers) 
counterparts, frequently led by university graduates who had been „Marx-boys“ as 
students, before they learned to conform, sometimes to lip-serving, but more often 
(alas for their later selves, when there were records to prove it) to enthusiastic and 
vociferous Japanism. It was their leadership, at first, which brought the factory-level 
amalgamations between blue and white collar unions which created today's single 
enterprise union structure. (Though separate blue and white collar unions still exist in 
a tiny minority of firms.) And they were most frequently the delegates to – or went on 
to become full-time officials in – the national union organizations which grew rapidly 
together with the socialist and communist parties. Within a few months in late 1945, 
Japan had a „movement“. 
The communists were the stronger, better organized, less frequently had a 
Japanist past to live down, were more determined and had a clearer idea of the goals 
the movement ought to move towards. They were particularly strong in the public 
sector unions whose members suffered most in 1946 from the collapse of the 
economy. But by the end of that year, in the private sector, too, there were many 
enterprise-level activists whose main goal in life – while they continued to drive 
tough bargains with their own employers – was the transformation of Japan through 
„the movement's“ victory. There were enough of them at least, and they had enough 
support from their members, for the Communist Party's national federation to 
dominate the other national organizations and create the organizational basis for an 
effective general strike. 
Which MacArthur stopped with a single order. Thereafter, „movement“ activists 
in the enterprise unions could only nibble at the system from within – by an 
unrelenting, „if our demands destroy the company, that's just one more nail in the 
coffin of capitalism“ bargaining stance. They steadily lost ground to „moderates“ 
who might acknowledge the possibility of a better, socialist, order in the long-run 
future, but did not see that as altering the fact that their members' welfare depended, 
for the moment, on the prosperity of the firm – men who, in any case, (for long-term 
job tenures were already the norm) often had a stronger sense of loyalty to the firm 
than they did to any of the organizations of the „movement“. The decline of the class 
militants and the rise of the enterprise-first group was sealed by the so-called Red 
                                                          
2 The best source on this period is the splendid book by Theodore Cohen (1987). 
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Purge which had started in the public sector in the post-General Strike crack-down on 
unions (which included legislation to curb their bargaining power, even in public 
enterprises such as the railways) and was extended to the private sector after the 
outbreak of the Korean War. The war gave MacArthur the chance to authorise the 
Japanese government to move in on the communists. Activist union leaders were 
dismissed under a special dispensation from the labour laws enacted a few years 
earlier. Some summarily, others gently. (The Communist members of Toshiba's union 
executive were given the capital to found a distribution company for Toshiba 
products, and ended up as millionaires.) 
The last few pockets of activist militancy were finally cleaned out over the next 
ten years – especially in the two epic strikes at Nissan in 1954 and Miike in 1960-61. 
A residual sense of class solidarity remained after all hopes of revolution or a ballot-
box passage to socialism had disappeared; the leadership of many unions remained 
committed to support of the Socialist Party, though that party never developed a very 
convincing social programme, and never came close to being the majority party able 
to form a government. (Its bitterest disputes with the ruling party were over matters 
of foreign policy (the American alliance versus Russia/China-leaning neutralism), 
and over issues it interpreted as conservative attempts to return to a prewar Japanist 
Japan such as the ideological content of education.) The Socialist-Party-affiliated 
unions developed, too, in the mid-1950s, the „Spring Struggle“ pattern of 
coordinating annual wage negotiations. Bargaining continued to be conducted almost 
exclusively at the individual enterprise level, but strategy reflected a „brother should 
help brother“ ideology – the phasing of bargaining and strike threats was coordinated 
between firms in ways that strengthened the hands of individual enterprise unions 
trying to get their managers to increase the size of the wage „take“ out of the firm. 
But gradually, the attenuation of sentiments of class solidarity reached the point 
at which it could not, even to that minimal degree, win out over „enterprise egotism“. 
One by one, the private-sector unions fell away from this Socialist Party sphere of 
influence, left the Sohyo national federation (in which the Socialist Party shared 
influence with a communist minority, represented primarily in a few public sector 
unions such as the teachers) or the Churitsu federation (in which the Socialist 
minority shared influence with the purely apolitical) and linked up with the IMF-JC 
(International Metal Federation; Japan Congress) dominated by the „labour 
aristocracy“ of the steel, electrical and automobile workers unions, or with Domei 
which was affiliated with the Democratic Socialist Party, a party not easily 
distinguished in ideology and style from the conservative ruling party. 
The Spring Struggle declined in importance as the solidarity, and tactical 
capacity for bargaining coordination of the managers, came to surpass that of unions 
– and successive crises (the oil shock, the Nixon shock, the yen shock) together with 
the sense of common destiny and enterprise loyalty shared by managers and the 
leaders of their enterprise union, diminished the willingness of the latter to push their 
demands „unreasonably“. Strikes (not irreconcilable fights-to-a-finish of the Nissan 
or Miike kind, but selective fixed-term strikes as a calculated bargaining tool) had 
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been an important element in the bargaining process until the early seventies, but 
their incidence declined steadily thereafter. As the rightward-drift of the private 
sector unions began to affect the public sector too, the amalgamation attempts by 
IMF-JC and Domei national centre gradually gained momentum, and as a result of 
several organizational transformations they finally absorbed most of the rump Sohyo 
membership in 1991 to form a single eight-and-a-half-million-member national 
centre. 
Rengo, as this organization is familiarly known, was able to leave intact the 
organizational links of a minority of its constituent unions with the Socialist Party or 
the Democratic Socialists – minor differences which, out of respect for tradition, as it 
were, could easily be accommodated. As for its own political activity, Rengo 
succeeded, in areas where union membership was strong enough to be used for 
electoral purposes, in gaining a handful of seats in the Upper House, but its political 
agenda was obscure and anything but radical. Rengo's pronouncements on political 
and economic issues have seemed more often to reflect industry-sector interests 
rather than class interests – as when its pronouncements on the issue of a shift to 
indirect taxation, which the Socialist Party vehemently opposed, were made delphic 
by the automobile industry's enthusiasm for abolition of the luxury tax on cars as part 
of the imposition of a general sales tax. And the attenuation of that Socialist Party's 
own commitment to anything that can be called socialism was finally demonstrated 
when, in the summer of 1994, it entered into a tactical coalition to form a government 
with the former conservative ruling party and finally, on the 20th September, reached 
an accord on fiscal policy with that party, accepting, precisely, that shift from direct 
to indirect taxation. 
An enterprise-based industrial relations system 
The employment system and the union-management relation system was thus 
entrenched and institutionalised through the very process of eliminating all 
„movement“ characteristics from labour organization – both the class-consciousness 
and the society-transforming pretensions. It is a more thorough-goingly enterprise-
focussed system than that of any other industrial nation. 
It was a significant legacy of that history, however, that the Japanese corporate 
enterprise on which the system centres is – thanks to a more complete divorce of 
ownership from control than is found anywhere else – one which is aptly described as 
a „community firm system“, or, as some would put it, an „employee sovereignty 
rather than shareholder sovereignty system“. The main characteristics of the system 
are well-known and can be briefly listed. 
– Managements, including boards of directors, almost entirely composed of 
lifetime employees, who for the first decade of their careers have been members 
of the firm's union. 
– Uniform conditions of service and pay structures for all regular, full-time (i.e. 
not temporary or part-time) workers, including blue collar workers, 
differentiated only by pay levels. 
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– Implicit guarantee of lifetime employment for all regular workers 
– Pay determined primarily by the speed with which employees move up the 
career pay scale appropriate to their „level“ (largely determined by their entering 
educational attainment), that speed being determined more by their performance 
in the jobs they have, over their career, been assigned, rather than by the job 
function they presently perform. 
– What is, therefore, a career incentive system – that is to say one which rewards 
good performance not by short-term cash payments (of a contractual 
performance-related pay type), but by faster movement up the appropriate pay 
scale, and/or up the organizational hierarchy (which, contrary to common 
opinion, is not flat but, in terms of titles at least, if not of „reporting“ 
relationships, elongated to give more frequent opportunities for promotions 
which are sometimes more symbolic than functional – i.e., more designed to 
allocate rewards than to make for a rational division of responsibilities. 
Promotions sufficiently constrained by seniority to contain high-flyer 
expectations, and give everybody something to work for. 
– A system of job allocation which allows for a great deal of rotation for training 
purposes, reallocation and job-redefinition with changes in technology, daily-
shifting patterns of teamwork which blur individual job definitions – in short for 
a great deal of „flexibility“ – all thanks to the career pay-system's delinking 
from job function. (Rejection, that is to say, of the „rate for the job“ market 
principle which in most other societies is seen also as a fundamental principle of 
equity.) 
– A training system which makes little use of pre-employment vocational training, 
and takes little account of pre-employment vocational qualifications, except for 
engineers and other graduate specialists. Individuals are recruited for their 
putative general learning ability as diagnosed by their school records, on the 
assumption that both the general and the firm-specific training they need will be 
provided, on and off the job (but mostly on) within the firm. 
– Unions with membership confined to employees of particular firms which 
operate a post-entry closed shop for all blue-collar workers and the lower 
(younger) ranks of graduates on management tracks. The union has the function 
of protecting the interests (with respect to pay, training, work conditions etc.) of 
those at lower levels of the hierarchy, when they are affected by decisions of 
managers remote from the effects of their decisions. Wage bargaining is 
bargaining between the lower-level and less well-paid employees who want 
more wages now (or at least as much as the newspapers tell them the employees 
of other firms are getting), and the better-paid, more „responsible“ senior 
managers, more conscious of the need to conserve the seed corn – to use 
revenues for investment, for keeping the shareholders reasonably happy, etc. But 
it is bargaining predicated on the assumption that both sides are dedicated to the 
„prosperity of the firm“. 
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The two central characteristics to bear in mind when comparing this system with 
what happens in Germany are, first, the divorce of the pay system from particular 
here-and-now job functions and from occupational skill qualifications, and secondly, 
the effect of that divorce, and of the system of training, and of the long and frequently 
whole-working-life job tenures, on employee self-identification. Employees see 
themselves first and foremost as „people who work for Kaizuka Refrigerators, for 
Mitsubishi Real Estate“ rather than as electricians or architects – as members of some 
occupational group. 
The German industrial relations system 
The radical differences of the German system seem to be attributable primarily 
to the fact that, as compared with Japan, its labour „movement“ – both class-
conscious and aiming at social transformation – emerged at a much earlier period of 
Germany's history (the 1840s, to be precise, with an estimated eight million union 
members by 1922), and subsequently became strong enough to achieve some 
considerable success in the social transformation it sought: first to evoke (what were 
then called corporatist) class-conflict-healing innovations in the nineteenth century 
(e.g., works councils in the 1891 Law for the Protection of Labour) and then, in the 
Weimar period and again after the second world war, to increase the legal powers of 
unions in matters of wages, recruitment, training, etc. 
In short, it was the central organizations – the national leaders – of the 
movement's organizations in both parties and unions (not the firm-level decentralized 
unions' leaders as in Japan) which played a major part in moulding the institutions of 
training, employment and wage bargaining. They succeeded thereby, through 
legislation, in entrenching the power of national and regional – at any rate extra-
enterprise – union organizations in the working of those institutions. 
Ambitions to effect further social transformation may have become attenuated, 
especially after the SPD made its peace with capitalism at the Bad Godesberg 
convention. There may for many years now have been a substantial number of 
CDU/CSU members of the Bundesrat with a union background as well as the larger 
number belonging to the SPD. It may, in that sense have ceased to be a „movement“. 
But the union organizations have not lost their – institutionalised – class-
representation character and their officials have not lost their class consciousness. 
Hence the characterisation „system of class-conscious labour representation“ rather 
than „labour movement“. 
The divorce of ownership from control which is a precondition for the existence 
of the Japanese „employee community firm“ has not gone as far, perhaps, in 
Germany. The banks, which are both owners and holders of proxy voting rights for 
lesser owners, probably exert more control than the „committed shareholder“ 
business partners of Japanese firms – they are more likely to have seats on 
supervisory boards. But they are still committed, and concerned with the long-term 
health of the firms they control/influence, and not just with short-term gains – 
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certainly not with the gains to be made by operating in a market for corporate control 
which hardly exists. And that (plus the prevalence of private, non-quoted firms in the 
Mittelstand) much reduces shareholder pressure on day-to-day management, vastly 
reduces the fear of takeovers which affects managers in a stock-market-based Anglo-
Saxon system, and thereby increases the possibility of putting the interests of 
employees ahead of the interests of shareholders. 
And that possibility is institutionally reinforced by the presence of employee 
representatives on supervisory boards and the legally mandated presence in work 
establishments of works councils, elected by employees and armed with power of 
veto over certain aspects of work organization. 
Job tenures are on average almost as long in Germany as in Japan. Employees 
tie their career fortunes to the prospects of promotion within a single firm, rather than 
to spiralling mobility in the labour market, to a much greater degree than in the 
United States, if not as much as in Japan. This, plus the role given to works councils, 
serves to strengthen enterprise loyalties, to create the conditions for the „community 
firm“. But the institutions which foster competing loyalties – loyalties to class and to 
occupation – are also deeply entrenched. That these loyalties do compete was 
recognised from the time that enlightened employers first started creating works 
councils in the 1880s (before the 1891 law), and the insistence of unions in limiting 
the competence of works councils at the time of the Weimar reforms and again in the 
late 1940s showed that same recognition. The institutions fostering these wider 
loyalties may be listed as follows. 
1.  First and foremost, a system of wage bargaining through legally binding 
industry-by-industry agreements between regional employers associations and 
regional unions, with careful national coordination among the regions. These 
agreements cover hours and conditions of work and certain principles of work 
organization as well as wages. The adversarial class-conflictual nature of these 
negotiations may in fact be tempered by a shared consideration with the health 
of the national economy, but that does nothing to diminish the sense that the 
workers' welfare is protected by negotiations outside the firm, not primarily (as 
in Japan) within it, and the fact that there are, occasionally, strikes of traumatic 
proportions – such as the hours dispute of 1984 – serves to keep alive the sense 
of society as a never-to-be-taken-for-granted product of balance between 
opposed class forces. 
2.  This wage bargaining system has served to preserve a job-related, rather than a 
Japanese-type person-related, wage structure, in which jobs are, if loosely, tied 
to skill qualifications. This serves, and is intended to serve, to enhance the inter-
firm portability of skills (portability without loss of wages) and so lessens the 
employee's dependence on any particular firm and also, consequently, his or her 
tendency to identify with it. 
3.  The broad structure of the training system which certifies these portable skills is 
controlled outside the firm by consortia in which the unions play a dominant 
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(veto-wielding) role. They have consistently used this power to ensure that skill 
training (which is predominantly post-employment, though at the apprenticeship 
level with a good deal of out-of-firm schooling – the „dual system“) is primarily 
concerned to impart general, rather than firm-specific, skills. This serves to 
increase the worker's sense of membership in an occupational group which 
extends beyond the firm. 
4.  The importance of the unions and the agreements they negotiate for the welfare 
of employees, and the existence of fuzzy boundaries between what is within 
works councils' sphere of competence and what in the sphere of unions' 
collective bargaining, makes good relations with the unions essential for works 
councils, and this has allowed union-sponsored candidates to dominate in most 
firms' works councils. 
5.  The ability of the unions to secure a high and rising level of union dues (as a 
fixed percentage of wages, rising with wage levels) and the prestige attaching to 
the unions in general, have enabled them to create large and efficient 
bureaucracies and to recruit able individuals. Hence the national unions have 
leaders of a stature which enables them to treat as equals with employers' 
representatives and to take full advantage of, and to use their standing to 
preserve, the voice that unions have in the „Establishment“ – particularly in the 
tripartite structures (social insurance, employment agencies, etc.) in which 
unions take part, and also in politics. This prominence of national leaders gives 
the unions a „hearts and minds“ advantage in the competition with firms for 
employees' loyalty. 
6.  The „stature“, ability-to-deal-with-top-bosses, factor explains why, especially in 
large corporations, the employees elect to the supervisory boards of large 
corporations, not one of their own number, but a union leader whose career has 
been entirely outside the firm (though often one who, as a union negotiator, has 
dealt with the firm or its local industry). This is another factor organizationally 
tending to foster the sense that the „employee body“ has more in common with 
the employee bodies of other firms than with its own management. 
An enterprise-focussed system struggling to get out? 
A recent survey of trends in the German system sums up: 
During the 1980s a gradual transition has taken place as the bargaining 
process has shifted from the industry to the firm level. Attempts to deregulate and 
increase the flexibility of employment, developments in wage policies, a new 
framework for performance evaluation in factories, changes in enterprise decision-
making, and the new rationalization strategies have all contributed to this steady 
progression. Increasingly, works councils, rather than the unions, are assuming the 
primary role in interest representation and are being subjected to the pressures of 
new problems and intensified negotiations (Baethge/Wolf, forthcoming). 
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Germany, in other words, has finally proved to be not immune to those 
gravitational forces of decentralization which have brought an end to national 
bargaining over most sectors of British industry, have made the institutionalization of 
enterprise-level bargaining the central agenda item of Italian national negotiations, 
have fundamentally weakened the central bargaining power of unions in Sweden and 
Denmark, and ... The list could go on. 
Well before the 1980s there were characteristics of the German system which 
served to modify the effect of the factors listed above as nurturing union and class, as 
opposed to enterprise, loyalties. 
Wages 
The first was the nature of the wage system. The factors at work in other 
societies to produce large wage differentials between larger and smaller firms (size 
being quite highly correlated with technological complexity, degree of oligopoly, 
social prestige, etc.) were at work in Germany too. Major, high-prestige firms which 
used careful testing to make sure that they got the quickest learners as apprentices, 
were able to pay a premium wage to help ensure that they could keep good workers 
and wanted to do so. (Hewlett-Packard, near Stuttgart, said that twenty years ago they 
were told that it was their social duty to recruit some of the less bright youngsters 
coming out of Hauptschule and not only the Realschule graduates. So they did, if 
only to a token degree. Then ten years ago they were told that it was their social duty 
to leave the Hauptschule youngsters alone and not steal potential workers from the 
small lower-wage firms which were suffering from a shortage of labour.) 
This need has long since been accommodated in the recognition, in the regional 
contracts, that firms might – at the employer's discretion – pay supplementary premia 
– the Haustarif. At Hewlett-Packard this averaged 20 percent for manual and white 
collar workers, at MAN Roland in Frankfurt, 10 percent for (the majority of) manual 
workers on piece-work, 20 percent for other manual and white collar workers. The 
premium in some firms is said to reach 30 percent, but generally, there had been an 
erosion of such differentials in the last two years of recession. 
The existence of these factory-specific wage premia – and the fact that they 
fluctuate with the fortunes of the firm – are in themselves a factor promoting the 
worker's attachment to the enterprise. 
But so, also, is the way they are distributed, and integrated with the general 
wage system – which is a matter over which the works council has control. As the 
technical tasks performed by workers becoming increasingly diverse and complex 
with technological advance, they also become more industry- and firm-specific. It 
therefore becomes increasingly difficult in any regional-level agreement, (even one 
confined to an industry like chemicals, and a fortiori to an industry as diverse as the 
Metallindustrie) to tie particular wages to particular jobs. The agreement specifies the 
wage for job grades, and specifies a job evaluation points system which should guide 
the assignment of particular jobs to particular grades. But over the crucial outcomes 
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of that essentially subjective job evaluation process – the actual assignments of 
individual jobs to grades – the works council has veto power. Moreover, even in 
factories of 3,000 workers, works councils required to decide, say, whether a change 
in the responsibilities attached to a job justify an up-grade, are not averse to 
discussing the personal merits of the individual who will benefit. (Just as, when 
discussing management's proposals for keeping some and dismissing other 
apprentices, they do not hesitate to discuss their personal merits.) In other words there 
is scope for person-related elements to creep into what is ostensibly a strictly job-
related, „rate for the job“ system. 
And, as for the criteria which guide the evaluation of persons, there is one other 
consideration besides performance on which both managers and works councils can 
agree – seniority, the principle with the triple interpretation: 
i)  a sound „rate for performance“ principle on the assumption that accumulated 
experience makes workers more effective, 
ii)  an effective incentive system – see the discussion of the Japanese seniority-
constrained promotion system above, 
iii)  a „reward for loyalty“ based on recognition that the firm is in some sense a 
community. 
The distribution of the Haustarif also provided a means of rewarding seniority. 
So much so that the principle has been „captured“ and incorporated into some 
regional wage arrangements. The Bavarian agreement, and the Saxony agreement 
which followed it under the West-East Länder twinning system, have a single wage 
for each of the 10 manual worker grades, though there are four wage-steps within 
grades for white-collar workers. In other regions, however, there are wage-steps for 
each job-grade of manual workers too – six in Hesse, for instance and twelve in 
Baden-Württenberg. Under the 1994 agreement in the latter region, step one paid 
105.25%x – x being a notional basic rate for the grade – steadily rising to 123.5%x in 
the twelfth step. (One refinement: the average pay of workers in the grade should not 
be less than 116%x.) This allows for individuals to be given pay rises without any 
change in job – and it appears that the choice of giving annual increments – pure 
seniority supplements – or using discretionary increments as an incentive device is 
largely left to managers. 
One more factor pushing towards a more „person-related“ than „job-related“ 
wage system, is the current fad for „team-work“. The „lean production“ movement 
has revived notions of team-work originally promoted as a means of job-enrichment 
by the unions fifteen years ago – part of the Quality of Working Life movement 
which swept Europe and North America. If the team is made up of workers all of the 
same pay grade, it loses the supposed advantage of being a vehicle for the 
transmission of skills from more to less experienced workers. If the team is mixed, 
and the tasks are, say, some grade 7 tasks, some grade 8, some grade 9, how can you 
get the flexibility advantages if a grade 7 worker is not allowed to do the grade 9 job? 
Or, alternatively, avoid endless disputes, given the ingrained rate-for-the-job 
principle? (Relevantly reinforced, in this case, by the fact that the regional wage 
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contracts often have a stipulation that, e.g., if a worker does a job of higher grade he 
gets the pay of that higher grade if the assignment continues for a month.) The 
dilemma is apparent to many managers; one said that the ideal system would be 80 
percent of the pay packet to be determined by the worker's „basic“ job grade, 10 
percent by the team's overall performance, and 10 percent by an evaluation of the 
individual's contribution to it. But obviously, where the relation between pay and job 
becomes thus blurred, the tendency for that „basic“ job grade to rise with seniority 
will be increased. 
The result of all this is that the personnel managers can often quite easily sketch 
their manual workers' age-wage curve and identify the point of inflection – when 
annual percentage increases, having been on a rising trend, start to decline – at age 
35, according to the managers of MAN Roland. This is the point at which upward 
promotion from grade to grade becomes less frequent and increases come more from 
step-to-step increases within grades. At a 1,000-employee machine-tool factory near 
Stuttgart where the bulk of the manual workers have completed an apprenticeship, a 
typical career was described as follows. Coming out of an apprenticeship a worker 
would be getting, on present scales, something like DM 3,160 a month. If he stayed 
in the manual worker grades the top rate – the twelfth step on the top scale – would 
be a few marks below 5,000. But it is far more likely that he would move on up into 
the technician or the Meister grades and would be likely to be in the top-grade but 
one, getting something close to 5,000, by age 35. That would still leave him the 
possibility of one more grade promotion, the top grade of the technician scale with 
twelve steps from 5252 to 6102, or of the Meister scale, 5799 to 6959. 
At that particular representative of the Mittelstand backbone (Alfing) the 
average age was 40, and the average tenure 20 years – closer than most Japanese 
firms get to a lifetime employment system. Vacancies were internally advertised, and 
seniority as well as ability was acknowledged to be a factor taken into account. Job 
rotation had training intentions; they selected the teams sent out to set up assembly 
lines at their customers' firms, bearing in mind who needed to build up experience in 
dealing with customers. The managing director visits retirees on their 75th birthday; 
when he holds outings – for 25-30 workers at a time – he painstakingly learns the 
first names of all the men, so that their wives can be impressed by their husband's 
familiarity with the boss. 
Training 
The extent to which the training system serves to dilute enterprise loyalties by 
inducing a competing sense of indentification with an occupational groups is also 
frequently much exaggerated. There may indeed be something of this kind in the 
artisan/small industry trades whose training is organized by the Handwerkskammern, 
rather than by the Industrie und Handelskammern. The butchers and the bakers and 
the architects are organized as an Innung, a guild with traditions in direct continuity 
from medieval times, and the small proportion of their apprentices who survive for a 
lifetime of butchering and baking (i.e., not the majority who, in good times, go off 
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and man the unskilled assembly lines in the car factories), may well have a strong 
sense of craft. If they finally make it to owning their own shop, the Innung is still 
something of importance to them – for negotiations over government regulations – 
and as an arena for seeking the rewards of public office. (I say „a small proportion“ 
because these are the apprentices-as-cheap-labour zones, par excellence; one union 
leader claimed that in Baden-Württenberg 35 percent of the hairdressing labour force 
were apprentices.) 
But in manufacturing, for all the role of unions in creating and monitoring the 
system, and for all the emphasis on apprenticeship giving the individual portable 
skills which is deeply in-built in the system (one personnel manager spoke of how 
much more useful to the firm a tailor-made training would be, but they were not able 
to do that. „And so it should be, because there is the social policy function of 
performing our duty to the younger generation. Young people must be protected for 
social reasons.“) Nevertheless, it seems that the extent to which the system induces a 
craft/occupational sense of identification is a good deal less than it was until recently 
in, say, Britain. 
In Britain, after all, even after craft unions had grown into industrial unions, the 
apprentice-trained „craftsmen“ had a special division within them and a different 
colour membership card; wage agreements were framed in terms of skill status; job-
control unionism had as one of its major objects the reservation of skilled jobs for 
skilled men, and the use of unskilled men to do jobs once reserved for the skilled was 
known as „dilution“ and though it was allowed to creep in in wartime it became the 
subject of bitter battles. Nothing of that kind happens in the German system. 
Agreements fix the entry point on the job-grade scale for those who have completed 
their apprenticeships, but thereafter, promotion up the job and wage scale, and even 
accession to new jobs via the external labour market, are not subject to any 
union/occupation-group regulation. It is a function of demonstrated skill, 
accumulated experience and managers' and works councils' evaluation thereof. 
Moreover, „crafts“ disappear. The 48 trades in the metal-working industry have 
recently been amalgamated into six and those six have a common first year – a 
reflection of the extent to which the skill content of jobs changes with technology, 
and that turning out „completely trained“ workers, trained only in a narrow skill does 
not breed the sort of expert worker that firms need. More of the actual skill workers' 
use is likely to be acquired on the actual job, and apprenticeship becomes more a 
matter of acquiring general understandings as a basis for later flexible adaptation – 
more theory. The change, in other words, while increasing the portability of 
qualifications at the immediate post-apprentice stage, is a recognition that the 
operative skills of older and more valuable workers are more enterprise-specific and 
less portable than they used to be. Much is made in the recent academic literature of 
the supplanting of the old Meister-certificated foreman by a new breed of „system 
regulator“. These are not people who are experts in „system-analysis“ or „system-
maintenance“ in the abstract. They may have a good deal of general, and partly black-
board-taught theoretical, knowledge, particularly of electronics, sensors, transducers, 
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computer programming etc.,which they share with their fellows in other industries. 
But their expertise – the expertise essential to their job within the firm – is expertise 
in the particular, immensely complex production systems of their particular firm. 
Moreover, the apprenticeship system can serve as a kind of enterprise-
membership probation. This is particularly the case in the larger, higher-prestige 
firms. If you have passed the tests and got an apprenticeship in Siemens, you are 
likely to think that you have „done well“. (Though less so in the last few years since 
mass redundancies have given almost every youngster from the sort of families which 
normally produce apprentices some personal knowledge of the insecurity of 
manufacturing employment. One of Siemens apprentices in Dresden explained a bit 
morosely why he was there: „my German literature marks weren't good enough to get 
a bank apprenticeship.“) And if your apprenticeship is in a „good“ firm, you try very 
hard to be one of those taken into permanent employment. The works council at 
MAN Roland were very concerned in 1994 to maximise the number of apprentices 
retained, primarily out of concern for the general unemployment problem in the 
recession; the chance of ex-apprentices getting another job might be small. But they 
were also concerned with who should be kept on; they wanted to be sure that it was 
people who deserved it and who would make good colleagues. 
There has traditionally, too – though again the recession and the pressure to 
downsize has brought changes – been a pattern of „looking after their own“ when 
workers interrupt employment for training. One standard route to middle and often 
upper management has started in the Gymnasium, the selective schools for brighter 
pupils. They came to their apprenticeship later than those coming from the 
Realschule and Hauptschule – after gaining their Abitur. After a couple of years 
working in the factory they would then leave for the Fachhochschule – perhaps 
spending summers working in their old firm, and the firm would often make every 
effort to take them back, four years later, when they had graduated. 
These school-based qualifications – of the Fachhochschulen and of universities 
and other tertiary institutions – do, of course, have validity across the market, and for 
many graduates who have done an apprenticeship in a smaller, low-prestige, firm the 
last thing they want to do is to go back to it after they have graduated. But on the 
whole, there is very little in the training system which actively militates against 
enterprise consciousness. Employees' reference groups are found primarily within the 
firm, not in some group of occupational colleagues which cross-cuts the firm's 
boundaries. 
The behavioural expression of enterprise-identification 
These features of wage systems and of training systems have been dwelt on at 
length as factors which might seem to favour „enterprise consciousness“ and dilute 
the effects of the „class-consciousness-preserving“ institutions listed earlier in 
fostering competing loyalties. The emergence of some of these features in recent 
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years can also be seen as an expression of, or as a concession to the existence of, 
enterprise consciousness. There are other features which can be similarly interpreted. 
For example, one surprise was to discover the extent of piecework in German 
factories, even for skilled workers. Piecework has, it seems, often been the way wage 
premia (rates above the contract Tarif) have been organized, and the idea of 
rewarding speed and quality of work seems to gain general consent. There were 
managers who wanted to abolish it. MAN Roland with 1,500 workers on piecework 
had 20 people engaged full-time in the work of monitoring the system and working 
out wages. Also a large, if fluctuating number of highly qualified man-hours were 
spent on the planning – working out the standard times for particular new parts or 
operations. There were also frictions over the definition of minimum quality required 
for work to count, and over the measuring of downtime for machine break-down, and 
too much of supervisors time was spent on sorting them out. But many managers still 
thought that the incentive effects outweighed these costs, and there was certainly no 
consensus for abolition, such as developed in Britain in the 1960s and led to the 
almost universal abandonment of piecework. 
What happened in Britain was that the adversarial nature of shop-floor relations 
added significantly to the costs of maintaining the system. Setting standard times was 
a „battle of wills“ between the rate-fixers and shop stewards. The frictions just 
referred to – over quality and the measurement of downtime – were magnified by 
prevalent opportunism. Quality was rarely a shared value; what you could get away 
with you did, because beating the bosses was the name of the game. Moreover, the 
scheduling of work was often thrown into confusion by the habit of banking work 
tickets – partly to conceal the existence of „loosely-timed“ jobs that the rate-fixers 
might pounce on, partly to smooth out the averages – because down-time was paid at 
a rate determined by average piecework earnings over a period of weeks. Managers 
finally decided that the „aggro“ was not worth the pay-off. 
Something of the same problems do occur in Germany, obviously. A works 
council chairman went out of his way to refute the allegation that workers banked 
cards in the way just described; „we're not cheats!“. But he did so in passing, not as if 
it was a hotly contentious issue, and the manager in the same factory who was critical 
of piecework, and spoke of quality and downtime sometimes giving problems, did not 
mention card-banking. It seems a reasonable conclusion that the difference between 
Britain in the 1960s and Germany now is that in Germany, workers and managers are 
much more likely to share a sense of a common interest in the prosperity of the firm 
and the reputation for quality its products have; and more likely to be willing to play 
by the agreed rules. Cheating in Germany is cheating for workers as well as 
managers; in Britain in the sixties what the managers might call cheating shop 
stewards might call „chalking one up against the bosses“. 
The clearest manifestation of the sense of the enterprise as a community came at 
a machine-tool manfuacturer called Heller a short distance from Stuttgart. They were 
badly hit by the recession – sales over 30 percent down 1992-3 – and had reduced 
their work-force from 1,660 to 1,300 – primarily by voluntary early retirement under 
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very costly schemes, but also partly by even more costly dismissals which managers 
had to fight hard to get the works council to accept. By the end of 1993 they were still 
in trouble, but hopes of an upturn were growing. Managers persuaded the works 
council to accept a wages-for-jobs deal. They promised that there would be no more 
redundancies in 1994 if the workers would agree (i) to give up holiday pay; (ii) to 
replace the usual 13th month bonus as a proportion of the monthly wage (usually at 
least 60%) by a flat-rate DM1000 per person from the managing-director down. By 
the time managers started trying to sell this deal to the works council, they had cut 
their own monthly salaries by 15 percent. 
The arrangement – amounting to what Streeck once neatly described as „wildcat 
cooperation“ – was flatly contrary to the regional Tarif agreement. The whole works 
council here had been elected on an IG Metall ticket, and the regional office 
vigorously opposed the deal. The works council, however, decided to accept. The 
firm waited to see whether the regional IGM office would take them to court for 
infringement of the agreement as they were legally entitled to do. They did not. The 
firm offered its resignation to the employers federation, but was told that it was 
forgiven. 
In other places, clearly, managers' appeals to a shared interest in the firm's 
prosperity – sharing in sacrifice and sharing in times of plenty – fall on deafer ears. 
At the much larger factory of MAN Roland, in Frankfurt – not a family firm like 
Heller, but a firm owned by Allianz and the banks – the capital costs of re-equipment 
and the intensification of competition made it imperative, managers judged, to run the 
plant for the maximum number of hours a week. That would mean shift arrangements 
which would involve weekend working – something allowed for in the flexible 
working hours agreements which came out of the 1984 strike. But the works council 
was refusing to agree to such arrangements. The firm might be in trouble; the profits 
of its owners might be endangered, but the worker's right to enjoy his free time at the 
weekend and not in the dead mid-week was sacrosanct. 
Trends? 
It is obvious that the German system is not by any means as enterprise-focussed 
as the Japanese, and the extent to which loyalty to the firm-as-community has won 
out over competing class loyalties is far from reaching Japanese levels. But the 
pressures making for a greater devolution of bargaining from the national to the 
enterprise level seem likely only to accelerate. IBM is one large firm which has 
decided that the flexibility it would gain was worth more than the benefits it received 
and withdrawn from Gesamtmetall3, the metal industry employers' organisation. The 
gradual attrition of the membership of the most powerful union, the IG Metall, with 
the contraction of the manufacturing labour force, is bound to weaken its power at the 
bargaining table, its power to resist employers' attempts to make wage levels more 
responsive to enterprise productivity, and its power to bring the works councils into 
                                                          
3  with its service division (Anm. der Redaktion). 
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line when they are persuaded into save-the-enterprise deviations from national 
standards as at Heller. (In one factory's works council elections, recently for the first 
time IGM union members stood as individuals, not as members of an IGM list – 
presumably to make it more difficult for managers to argue that the IGM position 
represented only x% of the employees.) The weakening power of the unions will also 
have a long-run effect in weakening their ability to recruit able leaders of the stature 
of the immemdiate post-war generation. The absorption of the new Länder and the 
strike over the progressive East-West equalization of wages led to a compromise in 
which the unions accepted the principle of „opening clauses“ allowing low-
productivity firms to survive by paying lower wages, while retaining a union veto 
over particular applications of that derogation. The disputes over applications for 
resort to this opening clause (of 60 cases in Saxony, the union – entirely guided by 
remote unsympathetic IGM headquarters in Frankfurt according to an employers' 
representative – approved only 16, in two cases giving its consent only after the firms 
had gone bankrupt) have probably strengthened the employers' resolve to press hard 
at the next round for an extension of such measures. 
In the long run, it seems that Germany will probably continue to follow the rest 
of Europe on the road to a decentralization of effective bargaining from the national 
and regional to the enterprise or establishment level. To use the categories with which 
this paper began, Germany may well be on the road from a „system of class-
conscious labour representation“ to – the category suggested as apt for the US and 
Japan – a plain „system of labour representation“. It will not be a full Japanese 
version thereof (though by that time individualizing tendencies may well have made 
the enterprise focus of the Japanese system much less productive of self-sacrificing 
enterprise loyalties, anyway.) But it is likely to be more like the Japanese than the 
American version; that is to say the stronger enterprise focus will probably imply a 
stronger sense of the firm-as-community, because many of the characteristics which 
support that sense – in wage and training systems and particularly in the works 
council system of all-employee representation – are already in place. 
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